


# Party Organizer



May Meeting  
of Central  
Committee

Vol. VIII

JULY, 1935

No. 7

*Issued by*

**CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY U.S.A.**

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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## INTRODUCTION

**I**N THIS ISSUE of the *Party Organizer*, we are attempting to give the Party membership some of the most important sections of the discussion at the meeting of the Central Committee of our Party, held in New York, May 25-27. It is obviously impossible to reprint the entire discussion. We have therefore chosen excerpts dealing with the most important phases. The full reports are published in the July issue of *The Communist*, and should be carefully studied, and utilized for unit discussion, in relation to the contents of this issue.

The Central Committee concerned itself first with the organizational problems of our Party, and particularly with an examination of our shop nuclei. The first section of this issue, therefore, is devoted to a consideration of our shop work, with excerpts from the various reports dealing with this question. This basic examination of the Party organization was made in order that the Party might be better prepared for the carrying out of two of its major tasks—the welding of a broad united working class front, and the building of a mass Labor Party with its roots in the trade union movement. The second and third sections of the *Party Organizer* are therefore devoted to a study of the United Front and to certain experiences in the Labor Party.

In addition, the Central Committee discussed the agrarian work of the Party. Lack of space prevents us from printing the discussion on this question, but every Party member and particularly the Party functionaries should study the report on agrarian work, which appeared in the *Daily Worker* and the July issue of *The Communist*.

The Organizational Report made by Comrade Stachel, as well as the discussion, dealt also with the question of cadres and of Party leadership. The discussion on these questions will be found in the Agitprop Section.

“With regard to all of these questions, we have to say that while we are making progress, while our Party is improving its political life, its connections with the masses, and participation in struggle, while we are moving on the path of Bolshevization, yet what we have to hold before the Party today is the still enormous contrast between the broad opportunities that open before us

and the still limited extent to which we are able to take advantage of them, and to utilize them for our work. It is to remedy these weaknesses that we have these discussions. It is the greatest merit of this Plenum that it has helped us, on the basis of our experiences since January, to draw ourselves an inch or two higher, to be able to see a little bit farther, to penetrate a little more deeply, to make use of this for a more intense concentration of all our forces, so that in the next period, we will not only raise ourselves a few inches, but a few feet higher." (From the Summary of the Discussion, by Comrade Earl Browder.)

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## The Work of Our Shop Nuclei

**I**N REVIEWING the Party's organizational work, its present status and its problems, we must refer to the tasks outlined in the Open Letter, which were adopted in July, 1933, at the Extraordinary Party Conference. Because after all, it is not merely a question of statistics and figures as to how many members, how many new members, dues, etc. The question primarily is: "Are we making progress in line with the decision of the Open Letter? That is, to what extent are we making progress on the basis of our concentration policy in the main industries, in the main important factories and the most important trade unions? In this connection I quote briefly from the Open Letter:

"... it is time that the entire Party should understand that without a solid basis among the decisive elements of the American workers, the Party cannot lead the revolutionary struggles of the working class and free them from the influence of the Social-Democrats and the bourgeoisie, which still prevails among the decisive elements of the working class, however favorable the conditions for our influence may be. It is idle chatter to talk about the revolutionizing of the working class by the Party unless the Party conquers a firm basis for itself among the miners, metal and steel workers, railroad workers, auto, marine, and textile workers.... It is nothing but phrasemongering to speak about building up the Party and the revolutionary trade unions without doing this among the important bodies of workers in the big factories, in the important industrial sections. It is idle talk about the necessity of new cadres without developing them from among these very sections of workers."

We are using the above excerpt from the report of Comrade Stachel to the Central Committee, as an introduction

to excerpts from a number of reports, made to the Central Committee, dealing with shop nuclei.

These reports indicate not only the Party's strength, but also its weaknesses, and show the mistakes of our shop nuclei as well as their achievements. They also clearly indicate that while the Party has definitely made the turn to mass work, that this work has to be intensified and strengthened manifold.

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## A STEEL ORGANIZER REPORTS

The Open Letter in raising the question of concentration emphasizes especially the necessities concentrating on strategic plants. In the metal industry, this is of special importance because the majority of workers in the largest plants are unorganized, and in the majority of the largest plants there are company unions in existence; and here the main question is the organization of these workers.

We find that many of these plants comprise an entire community. The Blank Plant in the city of X and in Z is the decisive economic and political factor in the community. Because of the hesitation of the leadership of the A. F. of L. to organize these plants and the difficulty they have in agreeing among themselves along what lines to organize we find that with even a small group of qualified Party people, it is possible within a comparatively short time to influence the course of organization in these plants and to secure the leadership of these organizations.

During the last period we had several interesting experiences. For example, the Blank Plant in X. This has been a point of concentration. We had a small union started there. In 1933 a few Socialist Party members took advantage of the illusions of the workers in the N.R.A., and began to call meetings right in the plant during lunch, right under the nose of the company. They said, "The N.R.A. gives us the right to organize, and here we are in the plant organizing". The company hesitated in opening an attack, and they succeeded in getting thousands of members in the union. The S. P. elements, opening an attack on the leading Party people, succeeded in isolating them and getting them out of the organization. Our comrades reacted incorrectly to this. They said: "These Socialist Party members call meetings inside; therefore they must be company men." That is how they explained the expulsion of the Communists. This led to further isolation of the Party. Following this, during the election of a president for this union, a sixteen-year-old Y.C.Ler decided to run for president against the S. P. leader, who is an adult toolmaker with tremendous influence. This further weakened our prestige.

However, when the unity movement started among the independent unions, this union came in, with the agreement of the Socialists. Since that time the situation has changed. The union has gone on record in favor of the Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill, H.R. 2827. The Socialist Party worker, who had been attacked as a company man, appeared on the platform with the Party, for this bill. This Socialist Party worker approached us, saying, "Well, there are Communists in the plant who won't do anything. Maybe you can do something to activate them. Maybe you can use your influence, although I don't know if you have anything to do with the Communists."

This history is cited because it is an outstanding example of incorrect methods of work, as well as of a wrong approach to Socialist workers. With these methods we will never succeed in building a united front. At this period there was a great swing of the workers towards organization, and had our comrades understood how to work correctly, the union would have been in a strong position and the company union would have been defeated. At present, there is very little Party organization in this plant. The shop nucleus is very weak, and does not play a leading role in the factory.

In New York we are in a better position. We have nuclei in every union shop of any size. In Connecticut, although we do not have so many nuclei, those which do exist play a leading role. **It is interesting to note that in these places we successfully withstood the Red scare.** We are successful in building the existing organizations, extending the Party influence, and carrying through the Party campaigns. In New York, all of the Party campaigns are brought into the shops. One local decided that every shop which settled with an increase in wages should give the increase of the first week to the Scottsboro Defense Fund, and following this lead, every shop which has settled, has given their first week's increase to this fund.

When we succeed in establishing a shop nucleus, we have by no means solved our problems. At the Eighth Convention of the Party, the Y nucleus was used as a successful example of how to build the Party during a successful strike. Here the nucleus comprised 10 per cent of the workers of that shop. Due largely to the failure of the union organizer, himself, to understand his relation to the shop nucleus, this nucleus was not given the proper training, and was not taught the correct methods of work. The union organizer took the position that no one but himself could settle the question of grievances. The nucleus accepted his position and relied entirely upon this one comrade, and so developed no initiative of their own. Attempts are being made to change this, but the nucleus does not take the

leadership in that shop. The mobilization for the campaigns of the Party in this shop is very poor. Even the mobilization for May Day was not very successful, while in another shop where a nucleus of five members has been organized very recently, the mobilization for Party campaigns is good, and the nucleus is the leader of the union in the shop. This is because the leading comrades in charge of the local have encouraged the development of the initiative of the five Party members. This shop turned out practically 100 per cent for May Day. This shows us that the training given the members of the shop nucleus is of major importance, and is the deciding factor in the effectiveness of a Communist unit.

## SHOP NUCLEI IN THE CLEVELAND DISTRICT

By John Williamson, District Organizer

The key problem emphasized in the Open Letter of winning influence over the workers in the decisive shops and industries, as far as our district is concerned, rests in improving the unsatisfactory work of the already existing shop units. We already have 30 odd shop units, the overwhelming majority of them being in the biggest shops in the district. If we improve the work of these shop units we will not only broaden our base, but lay the basis for building new shop units.

Wherever our Party members in the shops and unions do not become active forces in giving leadership to the workers in the everyday problems in the shops and union, we find a peculiar reaction, which is best exemplified in the Toledo Strike. The workers were generally not hostile. But they said: Our picket-line is well organized. No scabs are being brought in; everything is peaceful. As soon as the company runs scabs in, as soon as there is trouble, we will call upon you." This might be a tribute to our fighting ability. But at the same time it is a serious indictment of the work of our comrades in relation to establishing leadership in the everyday struggles as practical leaders of the workers in the union. On the other hand, wherever we have entrenched ourselves in unions and do not run away from political issues and where we improve our general political agitation, we find Communists are welcomed and workers understand that the Communists are good leaders of the unions and strikes.

In this connection it is necessary to emphasize the importance and necessity of giving our shop nuclei the closest personal guidance. When this policy is pursued in relation to our shop nuclei we find that we have a very definite improvement in the work of our shop nuclei. The recent

strike situation in the X Plant illustrates this. There we had our shop unit meetings daily, and I myself met with them and with the Unit Bureau every day. As a result of this we saw that our comrades, the younger American elements, were able to go back to the union meeting, to the strike meeting, and actually influence those bodies, and even though they were not entrenched in any official position of the local, and the local union leadership was wavering and hesitant, to make serious efforts to carry out the Party line. We were able to establish an instrument of the workers in the form of setting up a strike committee, which had a parallel joint power, with the executive of the local. A strike committee of eight was established. We have a similar example in the B Plant where with a shop unit of six, 3,000 workers are influenced.

In the Z local union in the city of X, where we had given the greatest attention to the shop unit, there it was that the largest number of workers voted against the Clarity-Green agreement in Washington, and where the greatest opposition was put up to that agreement. As a result we have been able to recruit into the Party several leading members of the union.

At the same time, however, it is necessary, parallel with this, to establish better functioning fractions, through which we can give political leadership. We must create such political life in the Party units and develop such initiative on the part of the Party sections that the entire Party will become conscious of the problems of the Party and the policies of the Party in the concentration industries and unions.

## THE SITUATION IN THE NEW YORK DISTRICT

By Max Steinberg, Organizational Secretary

With over 200 shop nuclei in our district working among 163,029 workers, the main question with which we have to concern ourselves is the life of the shop nuclei, of the role of the shop nuclei in the class struggle. If our Party will succeed to a much greater extent in directing the activities of the whole Party towards the shops, and further improve the life of the shop nuclei, then many of the weaknesses manifested in our district—the still unsatisfactory composition of our Party, the weakness in many of our campaigns—will be overcome.

The question before us at the present time is how to develop further the method of giving day to day personal guidance and leadership to the shop nuclei, how to establish better contact between the shop nuclei and the sections. The importance of this question can be shown from a few of our experiences recently. When we issued a questionnaire

to our section committees on shop nuclei the sections were not able to report on them unless we would give them a week or two to locate their shop nuclei. There is not sufficient everyday contact between the nuclei and the sections. We had a nucleus which in the course of a strike grew from 12 to 30, as a result of the good work of the nucleus. But at the present time these 30 members cannot be accounted for by the section committee. Good leadership was given to the strike, but the section committee failed to consolidate the Party organization and to keep in touch with and give leadership to the unit. We have another nucleus, one in which we always took pride. But this nucleus, because it did not fully realize its role, because it did not go into the shop and study the situation, the trade union problems, the problems of the workers in the Yard, and know exactly what was going on, the shop nucleus was disconnected from these problems, and consequently the section committee was disconnected from them. As a result on a question of trade unionism, the Party made a wrong step, causing a defeat and a momentary setback for the Party, from which the Party is rapidly recovering at this time.

## NEGLECT OF SHOP WORK IN CHICAGO

By Morris Childs, District Organizer

We have given only casual attention to shop units, instead of paying attention and keeping in mind that this is the chief organizational structure of our Party. The general outlook on shop work was not linked up with May Day. Although we talked about the necessity of carrying on work in the factories, organizing the distribution of literature before the gates, the holding of shop gate meetings, etc., yet in checking over our May Day activity, we find that there wasn't a single shop gate meeting held in the city of Chicago. How does it happen that in our district, although we have 56 shop units, not a single shop gate meeting was carried through before May Day? This is because we do not treat our shop work properly, we do not pay the special attention needed in this work.

## THE PROBLEMS OF SHOP WORK IN DETROIT

By W. W. Weinstone, District Organizer

The problems of shop nuclei in our District is a very difficult one since the automobile industry is seasonal and so are our nuclei. The number of our people that remain in the shops when the season lets down are very few, the turnover in the factories is great, and consequently comrades find themselves in new shops when the season opens again. The formation of shop nuclei and the creation of

internal cohesion is likewise difficult because of the rotating shifts and the big distances which the comrades must travel from home to the shops. Because of the rotating shifts it is very often difficult to retain day to day contact with the comrades of the units. We have now raised the number of nuclei from eight to 26. But in the automobile factories, we must say that we have ten real living units. By "living" I mean actually functioning in mass work, as for example, the nucleus in the Packard shop, which did good work during the strike, and which got out a shop paper in an extra issue as soon as the strike was on, or the nucleus in X, which also played a leading role in the strike. In order to deal with the question of the transfer of members into the shop units, we assigned one comrade whose task it was to keep control of comrades transferred out of street units and to check whether they had been transferred into shop units. This comrade has regular weekly meetings with representatives of street and shop units and section committees so as to check in one and the same meeting whether the transferring out has taken place, the transferring is completed, whether the comrade has been visited, notified, etc. This had good results. In order to establish some internal cohesion, we paid particular attention to the question of the functioning of the unit bureaus which is the only body that can retain contact with the individual members of the unit and therefore bind them together.

## PHILADELPHIA EXPERIMENTS WITH INDUSTRIAL UNITS

By A. W. Mills, District Organizer

The building of shop units changed the character of our work, for through this we entered into an organized labor movement and influenced the course of events in that city as a whole. In connection with the building of shop nuclei we had problems which we tried to solve to a certain extent. We organized a union of almost 800 members—of tool and dye workers. These workers work in practically every important shop in the city. These 800 workers are not ideologically under our influence, but the organizer is a Communist and the secretary is a sympathizer, and after pressure upon these two we succeeded in recruiting five workers from the shop. As soon as we recruited them, we met with them, explained to them the tasks of the Party, explained the role of the Party in the trade unions, and then we left them without further guidance in a nucleus where shop organization was never even discussed. They asked about the problems confronting the union and could not get a solution. After an investigation we found that three of these five workers had dropped out of the Party. They did not attend

meetings any more because they felt the street unit could not give them any guidance.

They raised the question: "Why can't we discuss our problems with the comrades we have in our union?" So we organized these workers into an industrial unit, and as a result of this, we can see a definite change. In the near future, while we may retain this industrial unit for new members from this union, we will have built from this unit two or three shop nuclei in strategic plants, because these workers are key people, who have been working in the plants for a long time and have many connections. It was necessary to bring these workers together for a while in one unit and explain to them the tasks in the shop and in the union, before it would be possible for them to organize shop units in their respective plants.

## SHOP WORK AND THE YOUTH

By John Little, Y. C. L. District Organizer, N. Y.

In the process of reorganization there was a slight let-up in the building of shop units. Now that reorganization has been carried through, we are going into the question of shop units and seeing that the sections pay more attention to this work in line with discussions here. We have 47 shop units at present. There has been an increase of nine units in the past two months. This in no way can be called satisfactory. But the important point is that in the main these 47 units have not been carrying on serious recruitment. In contrast with the Party there is no fluctuation in membership. There has been a fluctuation of units, that is, units go out of existence and others take their place as a result of lay-off and seasonal industries. But there has been no liquidation of units for other reasons.

Here the question arises of the work of the Party in connection with the League. One example will illustrate how this question must receive more attention. There are some 30 joint Y.C.L. and Party units in which there are one or two Y.C.L. members. But in none of these units has the Party been a force in aiding these members or in helping with recruitment. This must receive more attention on the part of the Party. These members should not be considered as members of the units, but as special workers among the youth and unless the question is raised in this light, we will not be able to make the necessary inroads among the young workers.

## BUILDING OF SHOP UNITS OUR BASIC TASK

From the Report of Jack Stachel

In addition to the 4,000 that we have at present in the factory nuclei, we can organize at least 1,500 Party com-

rades from those who are unemployed. There are thousands of factories where we have not made the first contacts although we could make many through language groups, through the **Daily Worker**, through the I.W.O., through every organization. This we must do.

But let us discuss the work of the nuclei which we already have. These 500 nuclei, these hundred or more nuclei in the factories of 2,000 workers or more, that is the important immediate job for us. If we solve that question it will not only solve many basic questions of the Party, but it will also further stimulate shop organization and all our work. And here I think we can also speak a little bit about reorientation. Let us ask, for example, in some of our best districts, do we plan our work in a manner which fits in with this basic policy of the Open Letter—concentration on the basic industries, important factories and trade unions—and especially on the large factories where we already have Party organization?

Let us examine the best district of the Party in that respect in factory work, the Cleveland district in the recent period. We can ask Comrade Williamson to tell us when we plan to bring any given campaign of the Party to the masses in Cleveland, whether we plan to bring it in the first place to the Fisher Body workers, 9,000 workers of all strata, the majority native born? Likewise in Detroit, do we plan our campaigns so as to bring them in the first place to the Ford workers? Why don't we do that? Because we say, well, it is a luxury, so to speak, to build a factory nucleus, when we have got to spread the **Daily Worker**, to carry on the Thaelmann campaign, the Scottsboro campaign or an election campaign. We want results right away. If we concentrate so much on that we won't get results right away. Of course we have not been able to work out a formula for carrying on many campaigns simultaneously and successfully. We don't make these campaigns. The class struggle makes them. Our organizers say: you have got Scottsboro, Herndon, Thaelmann, you have got Gallup, so many local strikes, thousands of campaigns and money raising. Of course, we must learn how to concentrate, how to plan, how to combine. But, if we really had a Party of tens of thousands organized in the main factories that employ millions of workers, with nuclei that stand on their feet and work, and they have access to the workers, when we say Scottsboro, that would not be such a difficult campaign. When we have an organization that is active and has contact with the workers, at one meeting money could be raised and sent in.

These questions also will be solved if we will not be thrown off the main line against which the Open Letter

warns. While giving leadership to every struggle of the masses, we must continue to give the main attention to the selected concentration points, because there will be the decisive struggles, and there in the first place we must win these workers. This is the decisive task for our Party, and we must bring it before the whole Party much more forcefully than we have until now.

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## The United Front

**W**HAT can we say about our united front efforts since January? First, the conclusion that I think we can all agree to, that in every case without exception, where we organized and prepared the proper, correct approach to the masses and to the lower ranks of the leaders in the reformist organizations, serious advances in the united front have been made. In every case without exception. . . .

This is the first conclusion from our experiences. But we must immediately follow it with another conclusion, that these advances are not general. They do not take place everywhere throughout the country, but on the contrary, they are still the exception.

Which leads us to the third conclusion—that the advances of the united front are so spotty because our work is spotty, and where the united front has not advanced it has been our fault, the fault of our work, badly prepared, badly conceived, clumsy. . . .

We have placed the Party on the road to mass work. We have broken through the shell that kept us in one place and now we are moving. But the shell of sectarianism, although broken, is still in fragments sticking to our back. It is a barrier between us and the masses. We have to clear out the remnants of the shell of sectarianism, get it off the back of the Party. That is the task now. . . .

At this moment we must give the most emphasis to a concentrated drive to win the Socialist Party members to the united front, to bring the Socialist Party officially into a general united front. This is important far beyond the numerical strength of the Socialist Party.

A successful united front with the Socialist Party in America—what would it mean in our fight for trade union unity? Would it mean merely adding together the total of our members with the S. P. members? No, a successful united front between these two parties would mean in the struggle for trade union unity a multiplication of our striking power by five or ten times. (Excerpt from the

Report of Comrade Browder to the Central Committee Meeting.)

\* \* \*

Numerous examples were given to the Central Committee meeting to illustrate the three conclusions drawn in the report of Comrade Browder, the most outstanding of which appear below, and in a separate article, dealing with a united front established by a unit. These examples contain invaluable lessons for us, since they show concretely how successful united fronts can be achieved, as well as point out mistakes to be avoided in united front approaches.

## THE UNITED FRONT IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

By W. W. Weinstone, District Organizer

The united front on the question of civil liberties, which has been established in the State of Michigan, has not only local but national interest, in that it is one of the longest united fronts in duration, and one of the best organized. The united front around this question of civil liberties began not in the last six weeks, when it took organizational form, but little earlier, with certain negotiations which we had with the new leadership of the Socialist Party of Michigan, the "militants", after the old leadership had been swept out of office. We had a meeting with the State Committee in which they told us that their hands were tied by the National Committee, but they hoped as a result of our talk that we would establish certain friendly relations and that at the first opportunity particularly on the question of civil rights, they would attempt to make a united front.

So when the first attack was made—the Charter Amendment, which call for candidates paying fees instead of getting on the ballot by petitions—we raised the question with the Socialist Party of a united front, and the Socialist Party called in the Proletarian Party and together we conducted a short-lived campaign, for two or three weeks, up to the time of the elections on April 1st. In connection with the Charter Amendment, we raised the issue of a whole flood of reactionary bills in the State of Michigan. There were twelve or thirteen of these, the center of which was first the Schneider Bill, which made it impossible to make any change in government whatsoever by any means and then, finally, the Dunkel Bill.

To establish this united front, we utilized the Civil Liberties Union, which took the initiative in calling together the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and other organizations to set up a foundation for a conference to fight the Dunkel Bill and other bills. This found a favorable response in the ranks of the Socialist Party.

Preceding this, we had raised the question of the united front at the State Convention of the S. P., and this was met with a very sharp division between the Detroit and the out of town delegation, and as a result there was considerable pressure from the membership of the Socialist Party for a united front. Because of the sweeping nature of this Dunkel Bill, the details of which you all know, and also because of a series of attacks made by the reactionaries not only upon the Communists, but on the labor movement generally, it was difficult for the Socialists to escape this issue. We established a united front which embraces practically every section of the labor movement—Socialist, Communist, Farmer-Labor Party, the A. F. of L., every State Federation of Labor body with the exception of Kalamazoo (which is the center of these reactionary measures), the Michigan Youth Congress, the S. P. branches, the Methodist Episcopal Church, with Bishop Blake at the head, the Farmers Union, a new organization with 10,000 members; in fact everybody that could be gotten hold of. There are in all about 270 organizations with a total representation of 475,000.

This united front, once it got started, gained great momentum because the enemy had made certain blunders. They had put through an all inclusive bill, calling for students' oaths, for teachers' oaths, and as a result aroused the entire population. This gave us favorable ground for a wide front.

We held six local conferences, each one growing in size, three state conferences where we had up to 500 delegates, all of them called together upon two days' notice. We held one big hearing in the State Legislature and, in addition to a post-card campaign, and a telegraph campaign, held one big meeting in which we also drew in the former Attorney General, O'Brien, who is also a member of the Civil Liberties Union. We forced a hearing at Lansing against the will of the reactionaries. At this hearing eight speakers represented the conference, including a speaker of the Communist Party. The other speakers were Martel, President of the Detroit Federation of Labor, the Secretary of the Socialist Party, the representative of Bishop Blake of the Methodist Church, a young speaker, former Attorney-General O'Brien, Senator Luecke—all speaking in the name of the conference. It was attended by 500 supporters of our conference, and 75 Legionnaires, and lasted four hours, with many dramatic and intense demonstrations.

What were the results of this movement? It must be remembered that the state of Michigan is one of the most reactionary company-dominated states, with legislatures that received only \$3.00 a day for the time they serve, and are creatures of the corporation, a state that is notorious for

its reactionary legislation and for its weak social legislation.

First of all, we defeated a Bill to bar the Communist Party from the ballot. Secondly, we drew out most of the vicious teeth of the Dunkel Bill and reduced it to virtually a repetition of the Criminal Syndicalist Law. Originally it was a Nazi Bill, which would make impossible the possession of literature, the holding of meetings, the renting of places, would penalize those who rent out meetings to Communists, which would bar membership in the C. P., etc. What we accomplished was to prevent the immediate driving of the Party underground and sweeping anti-Red raids. Thirdly, we were able to beat back the new Anti-Leaflet Bill proposed in the city of Detroit. Fourthly, a conference has taken up the issue of the denial of public schools and thus far succeeded in obtaining a school for a meeting at which a Communist spoke, contrary to the practices of the last two years. Fifthly, we took up the issue of the denial of a permit to the Michigan Youth Congress to hold an anti-war parade and forced the Mayor to grant the permit. The major result, however, has been to create a real deep-going movement for the protection of civil rights. Practically all the local unions have gone on record against the Dunkel Bill and the liveliest sort of interest existed in every stage of the fight so that upon two days' notice it was possible to call together at various times, three to four hundred workers to come from various parts of the state to Lansing.

At the last conference held after the Bill carried, it was decided to continue the conference and to fight for the repeal of the Dunkel Bill and the Criminal Syndicalist Law which was adopted by unanimous vote. This struggle shows the depth of the issue of civil rights and the possibility by means of the united front and militant action to check the offensive of the reactionary forces. The result of these united front activities has been the raising of the prestige and the political influence of the Party, and consequently far wider contacts have been established in the trade union movement as well as among the middle class elements.

## THE UNITED FRONT IN PHILADELPHIA

By A. W. Mills, District Organizer, Dist 3

We have had some important events in our District in regard to the united front. We can cite our experiences on May Day. This brought together 27 locals of the A. F. of L., 115 Italian organizations, 15 Polish, and quite a large number of other organizations. This conference was actually a continuation of the work carried on around the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill, because our united front around May First was mainly built up around this major issue, and against war and fascism. Those organizations which

had endorsed and participated in the work for the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill, together with many others, participated in the United May Day Conference.

We did not succeed officially in establishing a united front with the Socialist Party in spite of the fact that many efforts were made, which the Socialist Party always refused. In connection with the May First preparations, the Central Labor Union issued a manifesto together with the Socialist Party, stating that there will be a strike on May First for the first time in the history of Philadelphia. We immediately reacted and endorsed it fully, and then there was an immediate reaction from the trade unions, and many resolutions were passed to endorse the strike. When the labor bureaucrats saw that there might be a genuine strike, they retreated. Instead of May First, they organized a one-hour strike on April 16. At the mass meeting held at this time we were not successful in bringing forward concretely the issues against the Wagner Labor Disputes Bill.

However, in connection with May First, the Socialist Party came to us and said: "We cannot organize a joint demonstration with you, because we will then lose the cooperation of the Central Labor Union. For the first time we have the opportunity of organizing with the Central Labor Union and we cannot lose this chance. We want you to give us one hour of your time to permit us to have a demonstration at the same place only about one or one and a half hours earlier."

We had difficulties with our members in respect to this proposal. Some of our comrades wanted to be very rigid and said: "No, we have the Plaza, and if you want a united front, carry through a demonstration on the basis of a united front." We had to combat this sentiment among our comrades, and among many workers, but we agreed to give the Socialist Party the time they requested for their demonstration. The result was that we had a perfect united front from below. When the Socialist demonstration was finished, the A. F. of L. speaker told the workers "our demonstration is over". Not a single worker moved, and the banners of the workers' organizations and of the trade unions remained in the Plaza for our demonstration, which was turned into a demonstration of over 40,000 workers.

There is an important lesson to be learned from this experience. Many of our comrades want to force the Socialist workers into a united front. They say: "Either you go into a united front or we will have nothing to do with you."

We must have a better approach to the Socialist workers, and slowly and patiently convince the workers within the

Socialist Party by striving and fighting for the united front. This becomes our major task.

## THE UNITED FRONT ON ETHIOPIA

By James W. Ford, Section Organizer, Harlem

There are a number of questions today that show the development of the struggles of the Negro people and the desire for unity, as well as the actual fact that Negroes are entering into broad united fronts in connection with the Party, or through the activities of the Party.

One of the first of these is the Ethiopian question. This is a question that has aroused the Negro people in this country to a movement as nothing else has in recent years. It has aroused them because Ethiopia is the first and last African independent state, and because they still pride themselves both on the culture of the Ethiopians and the long history of struggle of that nation, particularly because the people are struggling against an imperialist power. As a result of this feeling we were able in Harlem to begin immediately to initiate a movement for a united front with the most nationalist people on this one issue—the defense of Ethiopia.

It is very interesting to see how this united front was developed, particularly when you remember that a little more than a year ago the Communists and the Garveyites were fighting each other on the streets, because we did not understand how to work with these people. This time we organized a broad united front on the issue of the struggle for the defense of the Ethiopian people, which ultimately involved at least 60 Negro organizations.

The first problem we had in developing this united front was the question of the Communists. Some of the Negro nationalists wanted to raise the Red scare. Others said, as long as they are Negroes, we will work with them, but we will not work with white Communists. We went into the united front on this basis, because if these people are ready to work with the Negro Communists and are not yet ready to work with the white Communists, we could not hold back.

The Italian Bureau sent a representative to the united front conference. When he came to the conference, these people got up and discussed the question. They sent him out and discussed whether or not to allow these whites in and finally a vote was taken—8 to 7—stating that while we welcome the whites, now is not the time to bring them in. In spite of this, the work of the committee went forward.

Our white comrades in the Italian Bureau sent greetings and letters of friendly cooperation to all of these meetings.

At the same time we began to develop the issues around which we were fighting for the defense of the Ethiopian people, and to develop action. The first action was on May 7 in Harlem at the Abyssinian Church. There were 3,000 Negroes present, most of whom were not Communists. There the Communists spoke from the same platform as these other people. We were able at this meeting to show who are the friends of Ethiopia, and there we brought out the role of the Party of Italy, the strike struggles of the workers to prevent the transportation of troops to Ethiopia, etc. We also raised the question of the enemies of Ethiopia inside the United States, such as LaGuardia, Corsi of the Relief bureau who was at that time active in the relief hearings in Harlem, and who stated that there was no discrimination against the Negro people on the question of relief. We contrasted these people with the workers who had come from Italy to escape the fascist terror, and therefore were potential allies of the Negro people.

Later we took up the question of sending a delegate to the meeting of our Italian comrades where they were inaugurating the Italian paper, and one of the Negro nationalists greeted the paper. At the next meeting, we sent a number of the Garveyites to the Italian Workers' Center where our comrades discussed the Abyssinian question. They were so afraid of their reception that they went there armed with knives. Of course, our Italian comrades received them very well and donated \$5.00 to the fund, and they came back and made a wonderful report and said, "Yes, we have friends, and we must try further to broaden the united front and get the whites who want to assist us in Ethiopia. It is along these lines that we must work among the Negroes, patiently overcoming their suspicions and hesitations.

This experience in Harlem opens up a perspective of wider actions not only in Harlem, but throughout the country. Committees on Ethiopia should be set up on a nation-wide scale. We have the possibility of raising the whole political level of our work on this particular question. Here we deal with international politics and imperialism, where we can show concretely what imperialism means on a national and international scale.

Another question that is bothering a number of comrades in New York is the Father Divine movement in connection with the united front. The efforts we are making with Father Divine in the direction of a united front shows that the comrades in Harlem have taken very seriously the question which was raised at the last plenum—of going into the church organizations, making friends with these people. Through our united front with Father Divine we have been able to effect the penetration of a mass organization of the

Negro people. A very important fact to remember in connection with the Father Divine movement is the fact that the followers of Father Divine are workers, toiling people; that is why we are attempting to penetrate into this movement.

The united front with the Father Divine movement has been made on the basis of certain concrete issues. Our first united front was on the basis of the struggle against war, for peace, against fascism. This was on National Youth Day over a year ago. Then they elected eight delegates to the Washington Conference on Unemployment Insurance. They support the fight for H. R. 2827. Father Divine has branches throughout the country, and these people come to New York by various means—auto, train, etc. As they go through Washington, they are instructed to stop at Washington, contact their Congressmen and demand of them that they support the passage of H. R. 2827. They have also participated in the struggle against police brutality, and against discriminatory practices in Harlem.

We have been the subject of much criticism from the S. P. for making a united front with the Father Divine movement, and even in the ranks of our own comrades there has been hesitation, because they have not been able to "break the shell of sectarianism" that Comrade Browder spoke about. It is true that we have to guard against opportunism in this, as in all other united fronts, but that does not mean that we should not make them.

## EXPERIENCES IN A CONNECTICUT SECTION

By A. Wicks, Section Organizer

In our section in Western Massachusetts, practically the entire leadership of the section and units are comrades who have been in the Party for a period of less than one year, and most of the section and unit leadership is composed of comrades formerly in the Socialist Party. They had been in the S. P. for one or two years, and then came to our Party.

The new comrades in the Party leadership had and still have a great deal to learn, but they were ambitious to do things, were trying to accomplish things in carrying out Party work. In that community the comrades did not understand the question of the united front. The section was strongly criticized by old Party members who had these traits of sectarianism. They thought that in the united front all arrangements committees should have a majority of Party members in them or else the Socialist Party or some others would steal the show from us. We had to show them that this was wrong. We also had to combat sectarianism in the new Party members.

We concentrated in the B Plant, which employs about 4,000 workers, practically all of whom are in a Federal Union, and also in the C Works, which employs from 11 to 16,000 workers. We issued shop papers in these plants, and through these shop papers, and the increase of our shop nuclei there we were able last winter at the time of the Unemployment Insurance Campaign to have a conference to elect delegates to the Washington Congress. We succeeded in involving the President and Business Agent of the Federal Union, as well as other federal locals, and several locals of the U.T.W. in this Conference. We were also able on this issue to secure a united front with the Socialist Party in Western Massachusetts. We also succeeded in establishing a united front on May Day with the Socialist Party. Our experience indicates that if we approach the question of the united front with the Socialist Party on the basis of approaching the trade unions, the Socialist Party will come in more easily.

## THE UNITED FRONT MOVEMENT AMONG THE YOUTH

By Mac Weiss, Y.C.L.

In the period of three or four months since the last Plenum of the Central Committee, the united front movement among the youth has made tremendous forward strides in two directions: first, in the number of cities in which this broad united front movement, which is concentrated in the American Youth Congress, has developed. It began in five or six cities, and is now in existence in 30 cities, and not only has it spread out among the larger strata of the youth, but it has been strengthened by bringing the program of the united front from the top, where it was developed, to the masses of youth inside these organizations.

This united front youth movement is characterized at the present time by an overwhelming predominance of mixed class organizations. This raises a number of important questions for us. First, the necessity of working among the proletarian masses. If our Party and League are to play a leading role in this united front youth movement, these organizational guarantees must be established, i.e., our connections with the shops and factories and trade unions, which will enable us to wield a decisive influence among the youth.

The second question, flowing out of the first one, is the necessity of introducing into the youth movement itself sufficient organizational guarantees that the hegemony of the united front youth movement will be exercised by the proletarian masses of youth. This means placing the greatest stress upon the trade unions. We have already made certain beginnings in this respect in a few cities, but by and large we

have not yet solved this problem. We are placing the question squarely before the Party, because without the help of the Party we will not be able to solve it.

In this movement, it is necessary for us to place stress on the question of utilizing the united front youth movement for the struggle for Negro liberation among the youth. On this question we have won an undisputed leadership. The Y.C.L. is that organization which has fought to bring the organized masses of Negro youth into the American Youth Congress. It is particularly important to accelerate this, and we would like to place before the Party, particularly in South Chicago, Harlem, Baltimore, the necessity of helping the League in its work of bringing these Negro youth organizations into the united front movement, and thereby help to develop the Negro liberation movement.

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First and foremost, the keynote of our meeting is clearly the drive for a broader, most inclusive united front, with deeper roots among the masses, more concrete organizational guarantees for its permanence and its continued growth. This slogan must be carried concretely into every section and unit of the Party. We must speed up the tempo of the development of the united front work, improve the quality of it and carry it more thoroughly into the life of the lower organizations.

That means also that we must pay special attention to the sections and units. The discussions and reports here disclose excellent examples of how this has already been done—examples that can be taken as models by sections and units throughout the Party. We refer in the first place to the Harlem Section. What better proof can you have for every other section of the Party of the possibility of united front movement. In the united front work of the units, the Ridgewood unit (see following article, **Ed.**) is a good example. There certainly is proof of the enormous possibilities before the units of the Party in the field of the united front. We should have the ambition in every unit to catch up with and excel the Ridgewood unit in united front work.

The attention to our organizational problems, which are all directed toward the masses, must be accompanied by a strengthening of our political work, bringing the principal questions of the revolution to the masses, discussion of Soviet power and the way in which it can be achieved, and all of the questions that surround that central question. These are problems not merely for us, but the problems of the masses. We must take this principal question to the masses and especially develop it in the form of discussions and polemics

with the Left-ward moving socialist workers and groups in the Socialist Party. That means mass agitation and strengthening of Party education to make the Party capable of conducting mass agitation. (From Summary of the Discussion on the United Front by Comrade Browder.)

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## An Examination of Two Units

By Martha Stone, Section Organizer

When the comrades of the Central Committee came into the Williamsburgh section to examine two of the units, they asked to go to a good unit and a bad unit. I will deal with these two units in this report.

### Ridgewood Unit Establishes a United Front

About eight months ago, the unit in the Ridgewood territory was a unit of 18 to 20 members in a concentrated industrial area, a proletarian neighborhood, most of the workers being German. In this territory last year the Nazis had been able to break up mass meetings both of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, and were penetrating mass organizations and succeeding in whipping up chauvinistic feeling. Because of the Nazi activity there, and the inability of the Party unit and the entire section to deal with the problem, a certain demoralization set in. No more than six comrades would attend a unit meeting, petty squabbles would develop; there was no perspective and no orientation. As a result the Section Committee decided to pay special attention to the unit, and assigned the Section Organizer to work with the unit and attend its meetings each week.

The most burning issue in the neighborhood was the Saar question. The unit discussed this question, and decided to develop this campaign and effectively support the Saar movement. We decided that since our comrades did not have any contact with the members of the Socialist Party branch, which meets in the same hall on the same night, that we might utilize some of the sympathizers that had personal contact with the Socialist workers. We took up the question with these sympathizers. We had an informal discussion and when we went to the branch meeting on the question of the united front, these elements in the S.P. branch that were fighting unity were defeated, and we succeeded in establishing the united front.

Around the unity of the Socialist and Communist workers in Ridgewood we also got seven or nine branches of the Workers' Sick and Death Benefit Fund and a number of other mass cultural organizations. The climax of this activity

was a big demonstration of 1,500 workers, prior to the plebiscite in the Saar, where we rallied many of the German workers from the neighborhood.

Because of the mass activity of the unit, and because the unit had a clearer orientation and perspective there was an immediate change in the inner life of the unit. First of all, the meetings became more interesting. The unit has now between 36 and 38 members. A better and friendlier relationship exists between the Socialist and Communist workers. Before the united front, after the unit and branch meetings, which were held in the same hall, you would find the Socialists sitting at one table and the Communists at another. Now, they sit together and discuss things in a comradely way. As a result of the united front and the fact that we were flexible in our approach, we broke down the doubts and hesitations of the Socialists who were with us. When the City Committee of the Socialists came and tried to force the Branch to withdraw a few days before the demonstration, threatening them with expulsion, the Socialist Party delegates explained that they could not work with us, but spoke against the delegate who said that there can be no unity with the Socialist Party, and stated that unity must be continued and the movement developed, thus forcing the leadership of the S. P. to change their policy. It was the speech of this Socialist that assisted us in continuing this united front, where we were able to rally A. F. of L. unions and members of the Krank und Kasse.

As a result of this united front, and because the unit has a clearer orientation and perspective there was an immediate change in the inner life of the unit. First of all, the meetings became more interesting. The unit has now between 36 and 38 members.

In the beginning we had to teach this unit that it must take up political questions and decide them, and had to break down the idea that the unit cannot make political decisions, but must come to the Section at every step. We did this in the following way: We would take up questions at the unit, and the Section representative would raise the political questions, and encourage the unit to make decisions. As they found the Section Committee agreeing with them, helping and giving further suggestions to the unit, they saw that they could decide these questions, and confidence in themselves developed. The discussions at the unit meetings have changed entirely. All problems of routine business have become political, and likewise political discussions bring concrete results for the unit.

#### **Poor Unit Does Not Understand its Role**

The examination of the other unit shows an entirely different picture. This unit does not take up questions of the

neighborhood problem. It also is in a concentrated proletarian area and has a big center of knitgoods workers, in an A. F. of L. union. There is an American League of Ex-Servicemen there and other organizations in the unit territory, but yet the unit does not check up on the comrades nor take up political problems in the territory. The reasons are that the unit did not understand its tasks and its role in the territory, and that the section leadership did not give attention to that unit. The units in which leading comrades are members should be model examples, but because of the failure to develop forces that can take the leadership and solve the problems, they are not. In the unit under examination there is a leading trade union comrade who would attend the unit meeting and complain about a poor unit instead of guiding this unit systematically. This raised the question of the responsibility of the leadership of the Section to the unit, and we are now going to insist that where there is a member of the Section Committee in a unit that unit must be an example to the entire membership. Thus we will overcome a situation where we have the best forces in the unit, but the unit remains weak and does poor work.

The main reason for the improvement of the work of one unit is because it was able to develop local struggles. We have not as yet sufficiently understood the role of the street unit in the territories in mobilizing the workers on concrete issues and organizing them.

The work of the Commission of the Central Committee in examining these two units has helped considerably in bringing forward the weaknesses and good points in our work, and this should be done in all the section and districts. The comrades have been shaken up and are anxious to show that they can carry out the suggestions made. This should be followed up with a real examination of all our units, in order to prepare them for the big tasks they must carry through.

## The Labor Party

### EXPERIENCES IN CHICAGO DISTRICT

By B. K. GEBERT

**T**HE RESOLUTION of the January Central Committee Meeting in dealing with the Labor Party stated that "this Labor Party should be built up from below on a trade union basis, but in conflict with the bureaucracy". We have had a very important experience in this respect in Detroit, where through the Sugar campaign we have been able to unite large sections of labor, and where we can say that we are on the road toward a Labor Party.

We have likewise had some valuable experiences in Illinois, where attempts were made to form workers' tickets in the April elections.

The total number of towns where we participated were about a dozen, but I will deal here with only two to demonstrate two means of approaching the question of forming a Labor Party ticket and the results.

In Stanton, Illinois, a town of 5,000 consisting primarily of miners, employed and unemployed, the Central Labor body adopted a resolution to form a Labor Party in the town and sent this resolution to each and every union, to organizations of unemployed, women's auxiliaries, etc. This resolution was endorsed by all the local unions of the A. F. of L. and the P.M.A., with the exception of one local of the P.M.A. In this case we approached the question without ideological preparations in the various unions, with a campaign for the Labor Party, and when the resolution came from the Central Labor Union in the form of a communication, in most of these organizations we did not have Party or Left wing workers who understood the meaning of the resolution. In Stanton we have an active, but weak Party unit, in that it has not secured sufficient roots in the existing working class organizations. The result was that in this mining town, the Labor Party ticket was defeated, receiving only about 200 votes.

In Johnston City, a town of the same size, where our Party unit was also weak and inexperienced, the comrades proceeded in a different manner. They introduced resolutions for a Labor Party in the existing labor organizations there, including local unions of the Progressive Miners and the A. F. of L. After a number of local unions endorsed the resolution, then one of these locals called a conference, and at this conference, to which the entire labor movement sent delegates, including some organizations with which we had no previous contact, the Labor Party ticket was formed. In this town there was a Labor Party controlled by the local Democratic machine. In spite of this fact the conference decided to enter the primaries to take over the Labor Party. As a result the ticket elected by the conference overwhelmingly defeated the candidates, who were part of the Democratic Party. In the final elections our ticket received 994 votes, approximately 30 per cent of the total vote cast.

From these two cities we can see clearly the correct approach and the incorrect one.

What are our next steps in the work toward the Labor Party? Comrade Browder in his report answered this question by proposing to form Committees for a Labor Party. These committees can assume different forms, general com-

mittees, specific trade union committees, etc., but these committees will be of use only if simultaneously we will introduce resolutions in local unions favoring the Labor Party, and carry on discussions in the locals on this question. When the preliminary work is done, and we create an interest in the Labor Party, then we can take the next steps. In the big cities we can proceed to build committees for a Labor Party ticket on the basis of wards, assemblies, congressional districts, etc. We do not have to wait until we are in a position to have a city-wide Labor Party. In cities like New York, Chicago, and some other cities, it will take quite a long period of time before we will be able to have a city Labor ticket of a broad character. But it is possible in an Assembly District, in a given city, to form a local Labor Party.

## THE LABOR PARTY MOVEMENT IN MINNESOTA

By Martin Young

Our experiences in the Northwestern States have proven that the policy of the Party on the Labor question is correct, and so far as the Northwestern States are concerned, it has contributed a great deal in the improvement of our Party.

The major task that we are confronted with in presenting the policy of the Party on the Labor Party question is the struggle against opportunism. Many comrades in Minnesota and North Dakota liked very much the policy of the Party on the Labor Party question for opportunist reasons. They said, "We always thought this was not the time to build the Communist Party", and they try to use our Labor Party policy to try to justify their position. To a certain extent we have liquidated this opportunism.

The Central Committee has adopted a resolution on the Labor Party in Minnesota, and the fact that the Party began to orientate itself along the lines presented in this resolution had tremendous bearing on our efforts to break the isolation of the Party, not only in Minnesota, but in the Northwest. Naturally, this policy of the Party on the Labor Party question could not be carried through in a vacuum. It has had to be based primarily on the organized labor movement, the local unions of the A. F. of L. Secondly, it had to be carried through on the basis of certain struggles, and through these struggles to penetrate the labor movement. On the question of unemployment insurance, the Party in Minnesota carried through a successful Unemployment Insurance Congress, involving in cities like Minneapolis and St. Paul, a majority of the organized labor movement. This made it possible for our Party for the first time to establish closer contact with the workers within

the Farmer-Labor Party, really to begin to work within the locals of the A. F. of L. and in some of them to establish its influence and control, and generally to become a factor within the labor movement.

The increased activity of our Party within the A. F. of L. which is the base of the Labor Party has resolved itself in increased struggle of the Farmer-Labor bureaucrats against the Party members or progressive workers, even threatening them with suspension from the organization. The elections in Minneapolis show that the masses of workers still follow the Farmer-Labor Party, still believe in it, and that the main body of organized workers want to transform the Farmer-Labor Party from what it is now to a class struggle organization. This is the central question in the Central Committee resolution, and that is why this resolution finds such response among the workers.

But we could have had greater success in carrying through this resolution. What stopped us? Because we have not taken the necessary organizational steps in Minnesota to guarantee the maximum results of the policy of the Party on the Labor Party question. We have not organized the Party from below to show the comrades how this policy can be carried through.

## **THE LABOR PARTY MOVEMENT IN DETROIT**

**By W. W. Weinstone, District Organizer**

The Maurice Sugar campaign in Detroit has given us some vital experiences in connection with the Labor Party. We took the initiative in forming a committee for Sugar through a group of professionals, who brought in Martel of the A. F. of L. and Smith of the M.E.S.A. We were not in the first conference. Endorsements were secured from the A. F. of L. and the M.E.S.A. independently from us, but until March 17, two weeks before the elections, there was no real united front. At this time a united front conference was established, by taking advantage of a peculiar situation wherein the A. F. of L. had endorsed a Democrat as a Labor candidate for Circuit Court, because he was formerly associated and had served as the attorney for a number of unions. In the primaries, he received only 3,900 votes. We felt this would arouse resentment in the ranks of the labor unions because it showed the weakness of so-called Labor candidates running on the capitalist party tickets and could therefore bring home to the workers the necessity for a real drive for a Labor candidate. We then succeeded in getting together a conference of more than 200 organizations, 50 of which were trade unions, and set up a Continuations Committee, which included the Communist Party, trade unions, etc., to conduct the campaign. As a result of that

conference we carried through a big automobile parade, and a central mass meeting where Martel, Smith, Sugar and myself were leading speakers, and issued a special paper called **It's About Time**, published in 150,000 copies, in which the idea that labor must have its independent candidates was stressed.

In the final elections Sugar secured 63,000 votes, running highest in the Negro and foreign-born sections, where he ran first, second or third, but securing a high vote in all of the districts.

Now what is the result of the Sugar campaign as far as the Labor Party issue is concerned? The contrast between the 2,900 votes received by the A. F. of L.-endorsed candidate and the 63,000 votes received by Sugar shows the sentiment of the workers for a Labor Party. At once the question of a change of policy arose and a special meeting of the Federation and officers of the local unions was held. At this meeting, motions were made for a United Labor Party, which would have carried, if a hasty adjournment had not been maneuvered.

We have gone ahead with a conference to put forward candidates on the Independent Labor Ticket in the coming municipal campaign. In view of the fact that the committee which has called the conference had previously received the endorsement of the Federation, we are going ahead as though that endorsement still stands. We set up the United Labor Conference for political action, which contained about 18 unions, 13 A. F. of L. and 5 independent unions, including all branches of the M.E.S.A. and one organization known as the Designing Engineers. Many of the A. F. of L. locals, although they are Left-wing, have never been in any conferences with us before.

## LABOR PARTY COMMITTEES AND OUR NEXT TASKS

### From Report and Summary of Comrade Browder

We propose that in the struggle for the Labor Party we shall attempt to initiate committees for the Labor Party. We shall try as soon as possible to help establish a national trade union committee—a national committee for a Labor Party.

We propose that similar committees be set up everywhere on a local scale. These committees shall be organized as quickly as possible, provided they are well organized. We do not want quickly established paper committees which have no real existence. We do not want the miscellaneous scrambling together of a few names with no particular significance. We do not want committees composed only of those already close to us. That is no use to us, in fact it

will only be an obstacle. We want committees that will represent the broadening of the Labor Party movement so that we will be a minority in it—a considerable minority. We don't want a Party majority on anything in this.

These committees should become the centers of active agitation and propaganda for a Labor Party to furnish outside stimulus to the task of getting local unions of the A. F. of L. on record for a Labor Party. It could be argued that such committees be brought together only on a representative basis of those elected from trade unions. But, in my opinion, this would delay progress. We need to get these unions on record for a Labor Party and get them to elect representatives. We need something to speed up this progress because, in spite of the sentiment for it, nothing is being done to organize it. Organizational work must be begun.

The fight for the Labor Party must be brought now to a higher stage. We must harness up all the growing anti-capitalist sentiment and ideas among the masses. At the same time it must be concrete and base itself upon the most important sections of the working class, and especially upon the trade unions in the basic industries and the big shops. That is, the fight for the Labor Party combines the broadest aspect of our mass movement against capitalism, together with the most concentrated form of our concentration work in the application of the Open Letter. With regard to committees for the Labor Party that are to be set up: in order to avoid the danger, that certainly will be present in many places, of a tendency to slide over some of the most difficult parts of this work—of building such committees, it will be best first to build up and establish **strictly trade union committees for the Labor Party**. We must avoid the building of general committees in which we will forget the penetration of the trade unions. This does not mean that we are to neglect all the other mass organizations which are of great importance in our fight for the Labor Party. Eventually we will want to combine all of these elements into unified committees, but at this stage it will be better to make the center of our work the trade union committees, building up special committees in other fields, with the object of unifying these committees eventually. Above all we must have guarantees that the basic work of the penetration of the trade unions takes precedence over everything else.

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# AGITPROP SECTION

## Support the Cuban Revolution

By ALEX BITTELMAN

From a Speech at the May Meeting of the C. C.

**N**OW I WISH to take up the question of the tasks confronting the Party in regard to the Cuban revolution. Comrade Browder has informed you what the situation in Cuba is, and what our Party jointly with the Cuban Party began to do in connection with the anti-imperialist fight in Cuba. Our Party is destined to play an important role in the setting up of the People's Anti-Imperialist Front in Cuba. It is necessary for our comrades to report to our nuclei on Cuba. From now on the support of the Cuban revolution is no longer a secondary matter. The revolution was always theoretically of first importance; it must become that in practice. The Cuban revolution, as we know from our Marxist-Leninist theory, is the ally of the Socialist revolution in the United States. We must begin to translate this into practical deeds.

What are the practical tasks confronting us on this question? First we must bring this question to the widest masses of the American workers. We must carry on systematic day to day agitation in favor of rendering active support to the revolution in Cuba. This we have not done yet. But we must begin to do it.

From Comrade Browder's report you undoubtedly gained the understanding that there is a revolutionary crisis rapidly developing in Cuba, that the central political task confronting our Party in Cuba today is the struggle for the setting up of a people's revolutionary government. A fight for power. Our Party in Cuba is preparing for it and in this sense it is proposed to set up this People's Anti-Imperialist Front.

No more serious blow could be delivered at American imperialism from the Caribbean area than a successful revolution in Cuba and you know what that would mean for accelerating the revolutionary crisis in the United States itself. Therefore, it should be the understanding that the struggle for support of the Cuban revolution must from now on become an organic part of our agitation. Just as in every agitation and campaign we have remembered the most important slogans of the Party, we must remember the slogan of support for the Cuban Revolution, putting it

on a par with our slogans "Against the N.R.A.", "Freedom for the Scottsboro Boys", "Free Angelo Herndon", etc.—one of the important political slogans of the Party today which we cannot from now on leave out.

### **Bring the Issues Into the Unions**

What are the concrete ways in which this campaign can be promoted? First of all in the unions of the A. F. of L. I am not sufficiently familiar to be able to say how much exactly and where we brought this question into the unions of the A. F. of L. I would venture the assertion that you could count them on the fingers of one hand. From now on this can no longer remain the situation. You know that the Cuban Federation of Labor sent a communication to William Green to get the A. F. of L. to render support to the Cuban unions which have been outlawed, suppressed, many workers jailed and murdered. They called upon Green to get support of the A. F. of L. for the trade union movement in Cuba. Green has referred this communication to Iglesias, secretary of the Pan-American Federation of Labor, and this secretary has let it be known he has taken it under advisement. I believe our comrades in the unions and our A. F. of L. Committee have an important responsibility in this question.

I want to inform those who do not know, that every ounce of support that the American movement displays for the Cuban revolution counts tenfold and hundredfold for Cuba. Every little work, every demonstration, no matter how small, in the U. S. in support of the Cuban workers find immediate response in Cuba in terms of redoubled attack and strength against their enemies and for the revolution. Therefore, I say that our first task in beginning to work in support of the Cuban revolution is to bring this question into the trade unions and with the slogans: "Support the Cuban trade union movement." "Demand that they be permitted to exist legally, that the death penalty for strikes on the sugar plantations be abolished." These are elementary slogans and should gain sympathy.

The second point is the Cuban delegation. The Party decided sometime ago that we should actively participate in getting a delegation of trade unionists and others to go to Cuba to examine conditions, to make reports and build up a movement there that would relieve pressure in Cuba. What happened to this delegation? Practically nothing, especially in the trade unions. This is a very serious question. I tell you this question is arousing great dissatisfaction among the Cuban Communists. When it becomes known among the masses of Cubans, they will ask: is the American movement sympathetic only in words or in deeds? Do they mean

what they say or don't they mean what they say? The Cuban revolution is going forward and it will win, but it is passing through a very difficult stage. As small as our Party is relatively, it is already in a position to build up sufficient support to relieve the pressure. That much we can do, I have no doubt, and we must do it.

### Harlem Sets Example

I don't want to leave the impression that the whole Party has done nothing. We have splendid examples of correct conduct in respect to Cuba. We have had a one-hour strike of sympathy for Cuba in Harlem, New York, initiated by the Latin-American colony. We have had a splendid demonstration of 4,000 people in the Teatro Compo Amore in Harlem. We have had a series of demonstrations in Harlem and in Wall Street. This is perhaps as it should be. When the Scottsboro case was brought forward by our Party, the first foreign country to begin the campaign was Cuba, and now Harlem is answering it in true international solidarity style. What Harlem has done, many other Party districts can do. I hope the comrades from the districts carry away the understanding of the duty and obligations to the C. P. of Cuba.

In conclusion, there is an important political question involved in what we discuss here tonight. There is propaganda that the Cuban revolution cannot win: it is so small compared to U. S. imperialism. The Trotskyites have rationalized this counter-revolutionary theory into the proposition that not until a Soviet government is established in the U. S. (and they do their darrest to prevent it) will the Cuban people be able to liberate themselves. Our Party in Cuba counteracts this and the revolutionary workers and soldiers answer our Party's slogans. Our Cuban Party also tells the Cuban masses that one of their most important allies is the American working class. Although we cannot tell which revolution will take place first, most likely the Cuban, but we must and will get the support of the American working class.

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## On the Need of Trained Cadres

By Jack Stachel

**O**N THE QUESTION of Party cadres. What do the reports show? Some improvements were made in that respect. Certainly. The Party in controlling, assigning and educating the forces is making improvements. The figures on schooling are important. We have the workers' schools, section training schools, national schools, district schools, etc.

We must also say there are increased literature sales in the Party of the **Party Organizer**, **The Communist**, etc. This all means an education of the Party forces and the training of cadres.

I can also add that there are developing in many sections and districts functionaries conferences, functionaries classes. For example, when I was in Cleveland, they were going to start a class for organizers, org. secretaries and agit-prop directors, and this has an important bearing on the training of cadres.

But we have a great shortage of cadres. I can mention only one point in this connection. Take Toledo, for example. The Cleveland district, as we know, is one of our excellent districts in many respects, developing the work on many fronts, including cadres. But yet the Cleveland district has not solved the question of an organizer in a place like Toledo where a year ago there was a heroic struggle which was again repeated this year, where we did not play the leading role.

The Party is growing, even though at a slow pace, the Party tasks are growing, the mass organizations are growing. The problems are becoming more complicated; we are not fighting an enemy under very simple conditions, where everyone can see the fight and who is who. There are all sorts of camouflage—Coughlin, Sinclair, the reformists. The problems are becoming more complicated and we must know how to answer them; the situation is becoming more tense.

All these combined facts require more cadres, cadres of a better composition, more native-born, proletarians from the basic industries, more mass workers; cadres more reliable, more educated, more qualified. Above all, cadres that can have initiative, to whom it will not be necessary to send telegrams on every small question.

These are problems after all, not for tomorrow, but for today.

Also we must talk about reliable cadres in the present period. What do we mean? We have a living example, here at our plenum, of what we mean. We mean comrades

who, under the greatest pressure, will stand up—like Comrade Herndon.

We need forces that can do these things—that can work against Coughlin, against the bureaucrats, and will not lose themselves even if the **Daily Worker** cannot be delivered, or at least forces who can read the **Daily Worker** editorials and know what to do.

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## The Training of Communist Cadres

By A. MARKOFF

**T**HE PROBLEM of training cadres for the Communist Party, the Y.C.L., trade unions and other mass organizations has been before us during the entire development of our Party. It will continue to occupy an important position not only during the preparation for the Proletarian Revolution in the U. S. A. but also after the seizure of power by the working class in this country. The nearer the Party reaches the point of becoming a mass Party the greater the problem of training of cadres.

We have discussed this problem in print, at our Party conventions, plenums, district and section committees, etc. But, in the spirit of self-criticism, we must state that so far only initial steps have been taken in the direction of solving this problem, and those initial steps are very inadequate.

### Bolshevik Approach to This Problem

In all our work we must develop a Bolshevik approach, we must develop "the style of work" which Comrade Stalin has so stressed. Comrade Stalin said: "What I have in mind is style in the work, those particular and peculiar features inherent in the practice of Leninism which give rise to the special type of the Leninist worker. . . . There are two special features: a) the wide Russian revolutionary range of action and b) American efficiency. . . . Only this union will produce the finished type of Leninist worker, the Leninist style of work." (**Foundations of Leninism**, p. 123.)

Now let us ask ourselves this question. Have we in our work of training cadres applied the style of work characterized by Comrade Stalin? The answer, in our opinion, is negative. To develop the Leninist style of work we must combine correct planning, revolutionary zeal, and efficiency in carrying out the plans. There are two basic phases in the training of cadres: 1) The drawing in of young proletarian comrades into the leading work of the Party and the Y.C.L., trade unions, etc., into the higher committees; 2) to develop further the older comrades, those

who are already occupying leading positions in our movement. This requires a clear policy, a program which will produce the best possible results.

The training of our comrades must begin from the moment the workers join the Party. If our Party is to be a Bolshevik Party in fact, not merely in words, we must strive to make our Party the real vanguard of the working class capable of leading the workers in the everyday struggles. The Party must be sensitive to the slightest manifestation of readiness to struggle on the part of the workers, we must feel the pulse of the workers at all times, we must be in a position to utilize a given situation and organize and lead the struggles of the workers. This first of all requires that our Party be rooted in the shops, factories, mills, mines, among the unemployed workers, among the veterans, women workers, young workers, Negro masses, etc., etc. We must constitute the very core of the mass organizations of the workers. The presence of the Party must be felt by the workers. This cannot be achieved as a result of a mechanical approach on the part of our comrades to the problems of the organizations they are in; we must not appear as aliens injected from the outside, but as an integral part of the organization, whether it be a trade union or any other mass organization. This requires, in the first place, the building and strengthening of shop nuclei, the organization and consolidation of the fractions of our Party members within the mass organizations. Directly connected with this is the political development of our members within the shop nuclei, fractions, etc.

In order to carry on the Party work in a correct Leninist manner the comrades must have an understanding of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. This theoretical understanding must be acquired by the members. The combination of theoretical development plus practical experience in the class struggle will produce the type of Leninist worker which Comrade Stalin referred to. This theoretical training must be conducted by the Party in a systematic, planned manner. We must begin with the new members. In other words, we must develop a program and plan for the elementary Marxist-Leninist education of the members of the Party.

If we examine the elementary education conducted within the Party at the present time we must state that it does not display the character of Leninist style of work. In many sections of the Party no training at all is going on. In those places where classes for new members have been introduced into the Sections, Units, etc., this work has been conducted in a sporadic manner without a plan, without a program, and therefore producing poor results. We cannot

afford any longer at this time to continue our work in that manner. We must, with a Bolshevik determination, develop within the shortest possible time a systematic plan and program for the elementary Marxist-Leninist education of our members; we must charge the Agit-Prop Commission of the Central Committee, the Workers Schools, etc. with the task of preparing material for reading and study suitable for new members of the Party. The lack of a systematic program and plan for elementary education is responsible in many instances for the large number of applicants for membership dropping out of the Party. There are cases where a worker signs an application card at a mass meeting, demonstration, etc. and then for one reason or another does not actually join the Party. But there is no reason for many of the members who have joined the Party, to drop out after a certain time. The opposite should be the case. The Party should instill into the new member additional enthusiasm and desire for active work within the movement. There is no doubt that if the new members joining the Party would receive a training in the principles of our movement, that fluctuation in the Party membership would be reduced to a minimum. But the problem does not end with the development of a program and a plan of work. We must also include in that plan the development of our older comrades who would be in a position to train the new members. This can be accomplished through special courses for certain Unit members, Section classes, etc.

We often hear in the Party that there are no forces for the training of the new members, as well as of the older members. While this may have been correct in the past, it is no longer true today. We have quite a number of comrades sufficiently developed to carry on this work. In addition to this we have an important instrument developed which can be made use of for the theoretical training of our members.

### **The Workers Schools**

Under the leadership and guidance of our Party we have succeeded in building up a number of Workers Schools in various parts of the country. In the most important cities, like New York, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and a number of other places, Workers Schools are functioning. In New York four branches, in addition to the central school, have been established; in Chicago, two or three branches outside of the central school. The question arises, how much use did the Party make of these schools? Did the Party organizations in the given localities make a conscious effort to utilize the schools with their facilities

for the training of the members of the Party? Did the Party organizations discuss plans for the introduction of special courses for the members of the Party into the schools? Did the Party organizations take sufficient interest in examining the courses with a view of making them more concrete? Again, in the spirit of self-criticism, we must state that the Party organizations did very little and in many instances manifested an attitude of indifference towards these schools.

While the teaching of Marxism-Leninism to hundreds, and thousands even, of workers, intellectuals, outside of the Party, is of tremendous importance and value to our movement, the Workers Schools should and must be utilized for the education of the Party members, members of trade unions and other mass organizations. The attitude of indifference, therefore, on the part of Party organizations, towards these schools, is inexcusable. It marks a peculiar type of work which cannot be classed as Leninist style of work in the sense given by Comrade Stalin.

We can and must develop the schools as instruments for the Party organizations have displayed greater interest in the schools during this year than heretofore. In New York, for example, with the aid of the Party District Committee, as well as of the Y.C.L., the number of students in the school from the Party and the League has increased manifold. Special courses for members of Sections have been introduced. Special courses for financial secretaries of Units have been carried through. This is a tremendous step forward, but more must be done. The Workers Schools must become more integrated with the work of the Party; there should be more direct control and supervision over the work of the schools, over the teachers, courses given, etc.

We can and must develop the schools as instruments for the training of cadres for the revolutionary movement. But here again we find that while with the aid of the Party and the League the Workers Schools have been successful in attracting more Party members into the classes, these members are often prevented from attending the courses regularly because of certain assignments on the day of their classes. There has been a standing rule in the Party that members are to be given at least one night a week for education. But this decision is not generally adhered to. Furthermore, in cases where Party members do attend the courses they often lag behind the other students on account of the lack of time for reading. We must take this work of the training of our members very seriously and therefore must regulate our work in the Units in such a way as to give sufficient time to the members for attending classes and for reading. The comrades in the Units will find that

with the proper application of the above plan, that within a short time the work of the Unit as a whole will be greatly improved.

### **The Correct Utilization of the Abilities of the Party Members**

In discussing the problem of training cadres we must consider another phase, and that is the correct utilization of the abilities of each member by giving them the type of work which they are most suited for. This requires that every Unit Organizer, Section Organizer, etc., should be familiar with each member, should study those who show greater aptitude for work and place upon them responsibility for activities for which they are best qualified. Too often we find that comrades are made responsible for work which is too difficult for them, for which they are not prepared, without giving them the proper guidance, etc. This tends, as it happened in several cases, to demoralize the comrade, to develop a feeling of discouragement, of inferiority, which is certainly not conducive to the success of our work. We have also had cases where comrades assigned to work in certain Sections have been placed in such difficulties on account of the lack of a number of physical necessities, that it also tended to weaken the comrades, and in some instances to discourage and demoralize them. This is not a Leninist style of work. We must here also make a positive turn in the direction of a Bolshevik Leninist approach to the problem, which means that we must develop in every District, Section, etc. a definite policy for the development of cadres.

### **The New Members**

We have stated above that the development of cadres must begin with the new members. In addition to the theoretical training for the new members it is necessary for us to improve our methods of introducing the new members into the Party. With few exceptions, when a new member joins the Party his application is presented to the Unit, a question is asked by the chairman whether there is any objection to the new comrade joining the Party, and that settles the entire procedure. The new member is left alone, he feels himself a stranger, does not understand the phraseology employed during the discussion of the various problems, does not understand the nature of the problems, and feels completely lost. The only time they turn to him is when there is a necessity of assigning work, and a new member is very often loaded with assignments, the nature of which he does not understand and which he is unable to carry out. He feels that he has been neglected, that no real attention has been given him. This may seem exag-

gerated or too sharp a statement to make, but in many cases it is true and we must speak sharply at the present time, for we cannot tolerate a hit or miss attitude on this question. Too many members of the Party have dropped out because of this unplanned, unsystematic approach to the question on the part of the Units, Sections, etc. It certainly will go a long way towards keeping the new member in the Party, towards the instilling into him of greater enthusiasm, imbuing him with a desire and spirit to do work, if in addition to the reading of the application blank the comrades would take a few minutes to introduce the member properly, to say a few words about our Party, about the nature and the aims of the Party, about the character of our work, about the necessity of becoming more familiar with the Party work, reading of the **Daily Worker**, the necessity of bringing the **Daily Worker** to his friends, shop mates, etc. and then assigning one of the comrades of the Unit, one who is already developed to a certain extent, to sit with the new member during the meeting, to explain the language employed in the discussion, to explain the nature of the problems discussed at the meeting, and in the assignment of work, to assign to the new member a minimum amount of work, a task of the simplest kind which would insure good results and thus encourage the new member for further work. We are convinced that with the proper efforts taken by our Party, in a very short time we shall have brought about that unity of the qualities in our work spoken of by Comrade Stalin, namely, "Russian enthusiasm plus American efficiency"—a Leninist style of work.

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"The mobilization of the Party for the work in the factories and trade unions cannot be carried through on the basis of an abstract campaign. It can only be successful as part of the preparation of the Party to take up at once the fight in each factory, in each industry in the struggle, in defense of the interests of the workers, to give leadership to developing strike struggles (auto, railroad, etc.) . . . This requires that we prepare ourselves organizationally to lead these struggles; to take up the development of the fight for the workers' needs in the factories; to raise the confidence and fighting spirit of the workers; to develop their capacity to struggle by extending in the factories the Party and trade union organizations; to develop the united front of all workers; to build strong fighting oppositions in the A. F. of L. unions." "Tasks of the Communists in the Trade Unions, Resolution of the Eighth Convention of C.P.U.S.A."

## Methods of Agitation

By ALEX BITTELMAN

(From Speech at May Plenum)

I WOULD like to discuss a subject which we went into at great length at the January Plenum and at the Agitprop Conference—it is mainly the question of how to expose and combat Roosevelt and Roosevelt's Right opponents. I am under the impression, judging by the activities carried on by the Party since the January Plenum, that the decisions of that Plenum and its resolutions have not been properly understood as yet and very little carried out in practice. What is it that the January resolution said on this point? It said that our first business is to attack and expose the Right opponents of Roosevelt and after we have done that to show that despite the Roosevelt differences in method and phraseology and tactics he carries out in life the same policy as advocated by his Right opponents. We are not carrying this out everywhere; only in spots do we see an application of this line with the result that we are helping the reformists, whether we realize it or not, to arouse the mistrust and in part hostility to our Party on the part of the wider masses. Comrade Browder mentioned that Green and Company are charging the Communists with being in coalition with the bankers and trusts in combatting the Wagner Bill. Surely no one would say this accusation is rejected by the majority of the working class. On the contrary, large numbers of workers, the backward masses, which means the majority, are most likely to believe what he says, judging by superficial appearances. He says the bankers are against the Wagner Bill and the Communists are against the Wagner Bill, and hence are in coalition against something labor needs.

If he can point to the steel trusts fighting the Wagner Bill and the Communists fighting the Wagner Bill, the untrained American worker will say there is something wrong.

What and how are we carrying on agitation to combat these slanders and maneuvers of Green? We carry on very little convincing agitation to show the workers that this Wagner Bill is against their interests; secondly, by the failure at all times first of all and primarily to attack Roosevelt's Right opponents, we are indirectly enabling Green to spread this slander.

Green says the Communists do not fight the bankers, the Chamber of Commerce, etc., but the people friendly to labor and those who write bills friendly to labor. I believe this is a very important question and we cannot continue

indefinitely to carry on such an unskillful and incorrect political agitation against Roosevelt, against the Wagner Bill and against Roosevelt's Right opponents.

### How Reformists Should Be Exposed

Very often we hear the charge from the reformists that the Party, the Communists, are not interested in fighting the capitalists, but are interested in fighting the A. F. of L. leaders and the Socialist Party leaders. This charge also has an effect and confuses very large numbers of workers; and again by our all too often unskillful methods in carrying out the struggles against the reformists we indirectly help them to spread this charge against the Communists, which seriously hampers the united front. We spoke of this also at the January plenum. Not much fundamental change has occurred on that since then.

I take, for instance the shop paper which Comrade M has presented us at this Central Committee meeting. On the front page of this paper is a cartoon which has two human figures. One is a worker carrying a banner "Unite and Win" facing Lewis, with the inscription on top—"Organize and fight for relief, defeat the truce." I don't think this is a very happy or a good cartoon. Why isn't it a good cartoon? Because in this cartoon the enemy of the miner is Lewis—and where is the mine operator? Who is the enemy of the working class? The capitalist—that is our class enemy. The reformist is the main enemy **within the labor movement**, because he stands in the way of the working class fighting the capitalist class. But when you do the wrong thing then you carry on agitation as this cartoon does. It shows the worker only one enemy—the reformist. You are accomplishing two things when you do this—the worker himself may immediately react against it. What the hell is this. Lewis may be what he is but the enemy is the coal operator. Secondly, it helps Lewis to strengthen the barrier between us and the workers still following him which you must break really to advance in the united front. This is no isolated example.

It is important to note at the same time that in a little article of the same shop paper which deals with the Wagner Bill there is a correct and proper approach to the question which shows that some comrades did have a correct idea. After analyzing the bill paragraph by paragraph, they say: "We have to fight against this bill. We have also to fight those that say this bill is a good bill. This means Lewis and the others." This is substantially a correct approach. The bill is the enemy and if you must fight the bill you

must fight also those who stand in the way of our fight against this bill—Lewis, etc.

If we cannot at this stage in our growth begin to carry on correct agitation on such fundamental matters it will hurt very much the opportunities our Party has in advancing the united front.

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## Mass Distribution of Our Literature

By W. E. DOUGLAS

(Speech at recent Plenum of Central Committee.)

COMRADE STACHEL in his report cited a number of figures which show the advances which we have made, and are making, in the field of literature distribution. These advances are nothing in comparison to the advances we should be making. I am not going to burden my remarks with any further figures, but will rather deal with some of the problems in connection with the distribution of literature, which we have only begun to solve, and upon the solution of which depend further advances in this field.

First of all, comrades, we must convince our Party membership of the importance of literature distribution. We have not yet sufficiently convinced the individual Party members and section committees and unit bureaus of the importance of the distribution of literature in connection with the building up of our work, with the consolidation of our influence, with the development of our cadres, with recruiting for the Party, and strengthening the entire Party and its mass work. This is a primary problem which still has to be solved among the membership and leading forces of the Party, particularly in the sections and units, as the first prerequisite for the development of a real mass distribution of literature in this country.

The advances which we have made, I think, have a basis in the fact that our Party has gotten out of its sectarian shell, has gotten out among the masses. The masses are becoming more and more interested in our literature. But our Party has not yet understood sufficiently the importance of utilizing the mass activity of the Party as an instrument for bringing our literature to the masses. Our Party, as a result of its work, develops a great deal of interest among the masses as to what our Party stands for. But, while we find that the sale of literature is larger than ever before, these sales are registered for the most part in the book-

shops and other headquarters, indicating that the masses are coming to us for most of our literature rather than our Party members taking out the main bulk of our literature among the masses.

The problem of connecting up literature distribution with our everyday tasks is a problem of the entire Party. If we solve this problem, then we will have more and more masses coming to our bookshops and to our headquarters to buy literature; but the main emphasis must be placed on the distribution of literature among the masses by Party members in connection with their work.

### Leading Committees Should Give Guidance

In this connection, I want to speak on the question of linking up the literature distribution with the agit-prop work of the Party, and with the apparatus of the Party, generally. As a rule, the literature directors in the districts, sections and in the units are working in a sort of isolated state—apart from the main apparatus of the Party. They are left to themselves, conducting a little business by themselves, selling literature to the Party members and to workers generally. There is very little systematically planned distribution of literature in which the District and Section leaderships or unit bureaus take part. The literature director in the unit, section or district is left to himself, and he decides for himself what literature should be gotten and what literature he thinks will go. There is very little planned activity or directives which he gets from the Party apparatus as to what literature should be distributed in connection with certain work.

Take for example, the Hearst pamphlet, which was gotten out recently, and which sold very rapidly. The comrades simply took hold of this pamphlet and did a pretty good job in selling it. But Hearst is attacking the Soviet Union and is attacking our Party. Why, in this connection, can't we distribute other literature in defense of the Soviet Union, popularizing the achievements of the Soviet Union? About this time we also got out Molotov's report to the Seventh Congress of Soviets. Why was the distribution of this pamphlet so small? At the same time that we got out the pamphlet on Hearst, we also got out the Molotov pamphlet **Food For All** which directly controverted the lying campaign of Hearst about the Soviet Union. Why was this pamphlet distributed in such small quantity? The comrades simply took the Hearst pamphlet; they couldn't seem to understand why they should distribute the other pamphlets also.

We have the case of the Father Coughlin pamphlet.

There are big sales of this one particular pamphlet, but our comrades forgot about distributing our other theoretical and propaganda literature at the same time. It is important that we link up each one of our campaigns with the distribution of other literature—using the literature that is gotten out for the particular campaign for special concentration, but at the same time using other literature connected with it. This our comrades have not yet learned to do.

### Literature Into the Shops

The main concentration, I think, which we must make in the development of the mass distribution of literature is through the units of the Party, by which I mean, not only sale of literature to Party members, but the mobilization of the Party members for sale of literature to the masses with whom they come in contact. Particularly, we must concentrate on shop units. We know that some literature distribution is being made in the units; and from the report of Comrade Stachel, we see that there is some distribution of literature also in the shop units of which he spoke. But when we examine the extent to which this is true, we must say that this phase of the work—distribution in the shops—is our weakest point. Yet, it is in the shops that we must make our strongest point in the distribution of literature. It is through the distribution of literature in the shops that we can build greater contact with the masses of workers in basic industries among whom we must build our Party. It is through the distribution of literature in the shops that we will be able to develop methods which it will not be so possible for the reactionary forces to break down. They can close down our bookshops and headquarters, but if we learn how to distribute literature illegally in the shops now, we will have a method of work for literature distribution which we will always be able to utilize.

We also need more concentration on the distribution of literature in the mass organizations and trade unions. In this we are very weak—in New York probably not so weak as in the rest of the Party. I understand that in New York mass organizations take more literature than the Party itself. But the distribution of literature in the trade unions is everywhere a weak point.

The solution of the problem of mass distribution of literature through our Party membership is important in that it will help solve other problems of our literature work. It will build up our bookshops and increase the interest in our literature. Many comrades tend to turn the literature question the other way around. They want to establish a bookshop, and they seem to think that is all there is to it—that

this will solve the problem of literature distribution. Just the contrary; if we build up a mass distribution of literature in connection with the mass work of the Party—this is what will lay the basis for the successful establishment of bookshops. A few years ago, comrades would establish bookshops; they could not sustain themselves, could not pay rent or literature bills, and they would have to be closed down. Now most of our bookshops are standing on their own feet financially, and some of them even making some profit. This would not be possible if we had not established the mass work of the Party and the mass distribution of literature to the extent we have.

### **Build the Apparatus**

A few words about the all-important question of building up our literature distribution apparatus. This apparatus must serve the two-fold purpose of, on the one hand, furnishing a medium through which our literature gets to the Party membership in the units, and through them to the masses, and on the other hand, serving as an instrument for mobilizing the Party membership for literature distribution, and for taking the initiative in overcoming the many weaknesses in our work. Briefly, of what should this literature distribution apparatus consist? In each district we should have a District Literature Committee of three to five comrades headed by a District Literature Director. The duty of this committee is to plan and mobilize for literature distribution on a district scale in collaboration with the District Secretariat and Agit-Prop Committee; to call regular meetings of the Section Literature Directors at which the problems of literature distribution are taken up, and to keep, as much as possible, in direct personal contact with the sections, aiding them in organizing their work. Section Literature Committees should be organized having similar duties and functions on a section scale. In the units we need one comrade only—the Unit Literature Director—in direct charge of this work. He works in close collaboration with the Unit Bureau in planning the literature distribution, and must be a comrade of such ability that he can mobilize every comrade in the unit both to read our literature himself for self-education and in preparation for discussions, and to distribute our literature among the masses in connection with positively every activity of the unit and every individual Party assignment given to our comrades.

### **Financial Problem**

Now, comrades, I want to speak about the financial problem involved. We have a great improvement in the

financial responsibility in the Party at the present time—in the districts, also, to a lesser degree, in the sections and units. As a result, and also because of the fact that we have been able to establish credit in the center ourselves, we have been able to give the districts credit on literature.

This is very important, comrades, because with the mass of literature which is coming out now we cannot expect to get cash in advance from the Party. The volume greatly exceeds available literature funds. We could not dispose of all this literature on a cash basis to the districts. We want to establish such organization, responsibility, and seriousness towards this work that we will know that when we send out literature we will get paid for it within a certain minimum length of time. We find that most of the districts have a good responsibility towards this, but the problem here is concerned with organizing the work in such a manner as to secure such a rapid distribution that we could get the money back by the time we have to pay the bills in the center. If the districts do not pay us by the time we have to pay the bills publication cannot be continued properly. Financial problems begin to overshadow and distort all our basic work of publishing and organizing distribution. At present there is always a lag between the time we must pay and the time we get the money from the districts. This is a very serious problem, since we are now publishing large editions. Its only solution lies in the development of the organization of this work to a better degree than we have at present. The organization of our literature distribution to a degree even approximating the political importance of this work would more than solve the financial problem.

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“The example of the great struggle carried on by Dimitroff, Thaelmann, Rakosi, Scheer, Lutgens and all the innumerable heroes in the army of International Communism, must inspire the Communists of the whole world and the working class of the whole world, to bring about as quickly as possible the united front for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship, and directed against the new military gambles of imperialism, and the capitalist offensive. It must inspire all the toilers, all the honest opponents of fascist barbarism, to join the mighty anti-fascist front of all the people.

“For the liberation of Thaelman.

“For the liberation of Rakosi.

“For the liberation of all the prisoners of fascism!”

From “Comintern People,”—**The Communist International**, Vol. XII, No. 7.

## Commission on Party Education

**I**N ACCORDANCE with the decision adopted at the May meeting of the Central Committee of our Party, a Commission on Party Education has been set up. Comrade A. Markoff was placed in charge of the Commission. The Commission consists of nine members, as follows: two comrades engaged in the educational work, one representative of the Agit-Prop Commission of the Central Committee, one from the Org. Department of the Central Committee, a Negro comrade, a representative from the Y.C.L., one from the trade unions, one from mass organizations, and one representing an important section in the New York District.

The Commission will go into the examination and planning of the tasks in connection with the Marxist-Leninist education of the members of the Party. It will also later examine the possibilities for the educational work in mass organizations, such as trade unions, fraternal organizations, etc. Among the first tasks the Commission is going to consider are the following: 1) textbooks; 2) District schools, with special attention to some of the concentration Districts; 3) a program for elementary education in the Party. All communications with regard to problems of Party education should be addressed to A. Markoff, 35 East 12th Street, New York City, Room 301.

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## Theoretical Training

**T**HE following proposals, submitted by the Agit-Prop Commission, were adopted by the Central Committee at its May Meeting:

a. To approve the organization of three National Full-time Training Schools for the coming year (of twelve weeks' duration each), one of them to be devoted to the training of teachers in Marxism-Leninism and Agit-Prop workers for the Party.

b. To carry through District Training Schools in all the concentration Districts. In some places where the Districts are too small, several Districts to organize jointly a regional school, the respective Districts to finance the undertaking. This work to be organized and conducted under direct supervision and guidance of the Committee on Education.

c. To prepare a comprehensive program for District and

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regional schools. The leading Party members of the Districts to participate as instructors in the schools.

d. Section classes to be placed on an organized and systematic basis. The Party organizations to utilize the existing Workers Schools in this activity. A systematic program for these classes to be prepared.

e. A program for elementary training of the new members, and other members who have not received training before to be developed. Material for these courses to be prepared. The Workers Schools should be utilized also for this purpose.

f. On trade union work. The Committee on Education, together with the District organizations and the active comrades in the trade unions, to develop a program for educational work in trade unions and the training of trade union cadres. Special texts, material, outlines, etc., should be made available.

g. Two full-time training schools for the South to be conducted for the next year. A program for the work in the South should be prepared.

h. More circuit teachers to be trained for circuit work.

i. Special aid and attention to be given to the Y.C.L. in the training of cadres.

Self-Education. The Commission considers the question of self-education of the members as a very important means of training the members of the Party. Very little of that exists at the present time. The Commission proposes that the Committee on Education should develop a program with a bibliography for self-education. This will help those comrades who cannot receive systematic training in the schools.

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## WHAT ARE THE TASKS OF THE UNIT LITERATURE DIRECTOR ?

### Extract from Forthcoming Manual on Party Organization

The Unit Literature Director is not merely an "agent" or "salesman" who sells literature to the Party members at the Unit meeting, or who covers street and mass meetings for the sale of literature among the workers; neither is his task merely one of being a "go-between" bringing literature from Section Literature Department to the Unit meetings. Much of this work he must also do, but his tasks have a much broader aspect which we enumerate below:

1. To work in close collaboration with the Unit Bureau and the Unit Agit-Prop Director in planning the distribution of literature (what, where, when, how, how much, by whom).

2. To familiarize himself with our literature and be prepared to convince the Party members of the importance of reading and distributing each piece of literature.

3. To prepare the necessary literature at least a week beforehand for political discussions in the Units, and see to it that the Unit membership obtains same.

4. To check up and control that each Party member shall take out and sell literature in connection with his or her assignment, and establish regular distribution in their shop, trade union, or mass organization. To urge each member to mobilize workers and sympathizers to do likewise, and wherever possible establish a literature table or department officially in their organization. To mobilize also for sale of literature outside the shops particularly those in which we have no definite contact, at meetings of trade unions under reactionary leadership where we may not have organized contact inside, at opponent mass meetings, and at meetings of bourgeois-controlled fraternal, cultural, and religious organizations.

5. To check up and report on the reactions of workers to our literature and what literature is needed for their further clarification, and to become familiar with the conditions in the shops, organizations, neighborhoods, etc., and around what issues struggles could be developed and literature distributed. To see to it that all valuable experiences, particularly in distribution of literature inside the shops and trade unions are written up for the Party press or district literature bulletin.

6. To take the initiative in organizing collections, raffles, etc., at Unit meetings and affairs through which funds can be raised for the building of a Unit library of our basic theoretical books.

7. To keep a strict account of the Unit literature funds; see to it that all literature is paid for promptly by the Unit members, and that all bills for literature are paid promptly and exactly to the Section each week.